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Covert Influence Operations
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Covert Influence Operations

Authenticity is the foundation of our community at TikTok, and we strive to foster an environment where genuine interactions and content thrive. As part of that effort, we continuously work to detect and disrupt covert influence operations that attempt to establish themselves on TikTok and undermine the integrity of our platform. You can learn more about how we do this work here.

In this report, we disclose information about the covert influence operations we disrupt to promote transparency and share learnings with our industry. For information about covert influence networks disrupted before January 2024, please see our quarterly Community Guidelines Enforcement reports. Starting in May 2024, we will be updating this page with new networks on a regular basis.

Terminology

  • Networks operated from: Indicates geographic location of network operation based on technical and behavioral evidence from proprietary and open sources; TikTok may not be able to attribute networks to specific entities, individuals, or groups.
  • Detection source: Denoted as internal when presence of activity is identified solely through an internally driven investigation; external detection refers to investigations that originated through an external report which then led to an investigation.
  • Followers of network: Cumulative number of accounts that were following any account within a network when it was removed.
  • Ongoing enforcement of recidivist behavior : Details ongoing enforcement actions of accounts where enforcement is either (a) significantly technically-linked to a previously disrupted network or (b) bears a high degree of behavioral similarity to a previously disrupted network.

Covert influence operations

December 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between December 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,313 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection Source

Accounts in network

Followers of Network

Description

Internal


27,217

70,892


Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania

We assess that this network was operated via a fake engagement vendor and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network used inauthentic accounts in order to promote the AUR political party and independent candidate Călin Georgescu, in an attempt to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. This campaign relied on posting comments rather than videos.

Internal

323

41,584

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia

We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to certain political candidates and critical of other political candidates, attempting to manipulate Indonesian local elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to repeatedly post duplicative content while slightly altering the video caption.

Internal

117

63,765

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia

We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to a political candidate, attempting to manipulate Indonesian presidential elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas who did not appear in the videos posted.

Internal

68

2


Accounts targeting the Romanian diaspora in Moldova

We assess that this network operated from Moldova and targeted the Romanian diaspora in Moldova. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas to promote lurie Ciocan and the Social Democratic Party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. Accounts within the network were found to post an AI-generated video of Stephen the Great (Prince of Moldavia between 1457 and 1504) to promote the network's narrative.

Internal

51

1,177,876


Accounts targeting the war between Russia and Ukraine

We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives highlighting challenges faced by Ukrainian soldiers, questioning the credibility of the Ukrainian government, and suggesting declining support from NATO and Western allies. The network used technical means to obfuscate its true location.

Internal

21

123


Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania

We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote Nicolae Ciucă and the PNL party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas.

Internal

9

38,404


Accounts targeting political discourse in Iraq

We assess that this network operated from Iraq and targeted an Iraqi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote communism in Iraq. The network was found to create a variety of fictitious personas including activists and academics.

November 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between November 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 5,046 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection Source

Accounts in network

Followers of Network

Description

Internal

78

1,781

Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania

We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Călin Georgescu, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to amplify the same comments repeatedly.

Internal

64

28,990


Accounts targeting political discourse in Bangladesh

We assess that this network operated from Bangladesh and targeted a Bangladeshi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Bengali language favorable to a specific political party and critical of another political party. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.

Internal

12

1,704

Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania

We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Mircea Geoană, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to repost the same videos repeatedly.

October 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between October 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 26,964 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection Source

Accounts in network

Followers of Network

Description

Internal

132

88,667

Accounts targeting political discourse in Armenia

We assess that this network operated from Armenia and targeted an Armenian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current administration. The network was found to commonly use images of Garegin Nzhdeh as account avatars.

Internal

109

1,086,821

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia

We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in favor of certain political candidates and critical of others, within the context of Indonesia's elections. The network commonly used images of Indonesian politicians as account profile pictures.

Internal


107

5,026

Accounts targeting political discourse in Moldova

We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current Moldovan Government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to be using location obfuscation services in order to hide their true location.

Internal

45


8,389


Accounts targeting the war between Russia and Ukraine

We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content to artificially amplify pro-Russia narratives, within the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts.

Internal

26

66,507

Accounts targeting the war between Israel and Hamas

We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted a global audience, setting up accounts to target Arabic speakers. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives sympathetic to Iraqi and Iranian foreign policy on the Israel-Hamas war. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts.

Internal

21

17,863

Accounts targeting perceptions of the Chinese Government in Japan

We assess that this network operated from Japan and targeted a Japanese audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content in Japanese and Chinese in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the Chinese Government. The network was observed to redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links.

Internal

22

157,913

Accounts targeting political discourse in Moldova

We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created multiple accounts to artificially amplify pro-Russian narratives critical of the current Moldovan government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.

Internal

12

120,963

Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil

We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Portuguese language critical of the current administration. We assess that the network posted content on non-political topics in order to gain engagement before pivoting to political content.

Internal

12

3,442

Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States

We assess that this network targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created a series of inauthentic accounts mimicking US nationals in order to amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza and US support of Israel. The network was found to display advanced operational security.

September 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between September 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 9743 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection Source

Accounts in network

Followers of Network

Description

Internal

99

9,905,964

Russian state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (Rossiya Segodnya)

We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization Rossiya Segodnya (Including Sputnik news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations.

Internal

65

9,830,799

Russian state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (TV-Novosti)

We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization TV-Novosti (Including RT news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations.

External

42

127,451

Accounts targeting political discourse in Germany

We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network were found to coordinate outside of TikTok, through a messaging platform, where they shared tactics to amplify the reach of pro-AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) political content targeted towards the 2024 German state elections. The network attempted to circumvent action taken by TikTok against accounts or content that violated our policies.

External

22

299,692

Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania

We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to spread misinformation and promote narratives critical of the current Romanian government. The network was found to direct users away from TikTok to news websites which we assess to be managed by the network for the furtherance of its strategic goal.

Internal

15

134,537

Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil

We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to a specific politician and critical of the current administration. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.

Internal

14

140,955

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia

We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify political viewpoints through targeted content praising certain Indonesian politicians and criticising other Indonesian politicians. Accounts within the network were found to post very similar content to each other in quick succession, making minor edits each time in an attempt to amplify content reach.

Internal

11

27,873

Accounts promoting the Iranian military

We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted a global audience, setting up accounts to target English, Arabic, Spanish and Farsi speakers. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify content projecting Iranian military strength and content displaying pro-Palestinian protests. The network was found to create misleading accounts which used insignia of an international organisation.

August 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between August 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 7792 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection Source

Accounts in network

Followers of Network

Description

External

19,727

41,921


Accounts targeting discourse on the Ukrainian war effort

We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine the Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center. The network was found to display anomalous user behavior which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content and redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links.

Internal

489

394,321

Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico

We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, favorable to certain Mexican politicians. The network was found to pose as well-known news media entities in order to post content furthering its strategic aim.

Internal


76

214,715

Accounts targeting discourse in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine

We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted both Ukrainian and Russian audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Ukrainian and Russian, critical of the Russian government. The network was found to create inauthentic news outlets in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.

Internal

37

52,968

Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico

We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives critical of a specific Mexican politician. The network was found to post content in a news-like format critical of the politician. We assess that the network also created websites aligned with the accounts.

External

8

3,790,110

Accounts targeting discourse about Russia

We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the Russian administration. The network was found to display anomalous user behavior which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content.

July 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between July 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 6,019 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

238

530,476


Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia

We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify political viewpoints through targeted content praising certain Indonesian politicians and criticising other Indonesian politicians. Some of the network's accounts presented as dedicated 'fan accounts' for a specific politician.

External

94

44,896

Accounts targeting political discourse in Israel

We assess that this network operated from Egypt and targeted an Israeli audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza. We assess that the network coordinated online, outside of TikTok, and used artificial intelligence to aid in generation of fictitious Israeli personas, targeting different audiences by alternating between Arabic and Hebrew languages.

Internal

51

31,090

Accounts targeting political discourse in Azerbaijan

We assess that this network operated from Azerbaijan and targeted an Azerbaijani audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to the current Azerbaijani administration. Members of the network were commonly found to use images of the Azerbaijani coat of arms as account profile pictures.

Internal

29

137,671

Accounts promoting Russian foreign policy viewpoints in Europe

We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted primarily a German audience along with other European markets. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to Russian foreign policy. The network was found to alternate between multiple languages, indicating an attempt to target audiences from multiple markets.

June 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between June 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,824 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

External

35

109,537

Accounts targeting political discourse in Sweden
We assess that this network operated from Sweden and targeted a Swedish audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Swedish favorable to the Sweden Democrats political party and its agenda. The network was found to create misleading personas, including accounts impersonating government departments.

Internal

28

4,023

Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador
We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish critical of a specific politician and their associates. The network was found to create fictitious personas in order to post content at scale across their accounts.

May 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between May 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 3,183 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

350

321,237

Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States
We assess that this network operated from China and targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives that the US is corrupt and unsafe. Accounts within the network utilized audio originally produced on other platforms such as news broadcasts or podcasts.

Internal

250

58,641

Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama
We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and Panamanian audiences. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, in an attempt to manipulate Ecuadorian, Colombian and Panamanian elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures and were found to initially focus content on Ecuadorian politics, later switching to focus on Panamanian politics.

Internal

107

199,978

Accounts targeting political and social discourse in Mexico
We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish favorable to specific business interests, attempting to manipulate domestic political discourse and shape public discussion of social issues. The accounts within the network initially posted content related to food, gaming, tourism, and sports to build an audience before switching to political discourse.

Internal

67

322,297

Accounts targeting political discourse in Gulf Countries, in particular Saudi Arabia
We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted audiences in Gulf Countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic personas to share narratives criticizing social liberalization. After October 2023, the network switched their messaging to focus on the Israel-Hamas war. The network shared primarily Arabic-language content that was copied from authentic social media users, including audio voiceovers.

Internal

36

206,463

Accounts targeting political discourse in Pakistan
We assess that this network operated from Pakistan and targeted a Pakistani audience. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas in order to amplify narratives in Urdu favorable to a political candidate, attempting to manipulate Pakistan elections discourse. The fictitious personas were created with stock or unoriginal imagery as profile pictures.

External

32

39,877

Accounts targeting political discourse in Ukraine
We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Ukrainian and Russian languages critical of the current Ukrainian government, in an attempt to manipulate discourse around the end of the presidential term. The accounts within the network were found to amplify the same videos repeatedly by using different overlay text in each video.

Internal

9

19,261

Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States
We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives that attempt to increase division around immigration in the US and Europe, weaken support for the Ukrainian war effort, and criticize the current US presidential administration. Most accounts within the network posed as fictitious journalists or news brands.

April 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between April 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 3,263 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

580

148,627

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia
We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Indonesian language favorable to a specific presidential candidate, manipulating Indonesian elections discourse. The network was found to commonly use images of Indonesian politicians as account profile pictures.

Internal

521

38,428

Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela
We assess that this network operated from Venezuela and targeted a Venezuelan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language favorable to the current Venezuelan Government and manipulate discourse on the Esquibo territorial dispute. The operation repurposed content by posting the same videos on multiple accounts.

Internal

116

5,568

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia
We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Indonesian language favorable to a specific presidential candidate, manipulating Indonesian elections discourse. The network was found to repurpose content by recycling and amplifying the same videos repeatedly.

Internal

83

227,154

Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela
We assess that this network operated from Chile and targeted a Venezuelan audience, including the Venezuelan diaspora in Chile. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language in support of a Venezuelan opposition politician, manipulating Venezuelan elections discourse. On occasion, the network was found to alternate between posting content depicting the beauty of Venezuela and political content.

Internal

26

1,186

Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador
We assess that this network operated from Ecuador and targeted an Ecuadorian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Spanish language, which were critical of a leftist political movement in Ecuador and of Colombia’s current government. The network was found to initially focus its content on Ecuadorian politics before later shifting its focus to Colombian politics.

March 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between March 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 168 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

etection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

59

31,503

Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia
We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Indonesian language favorable to a specific presidential candidate, attempting to manipulate Indonesian elections discourse. The network was found to utilize numerous fictitious personas with stock or stolen imagery as Profile Pictures.

Internal

52

2,624,189

Accounts targeting war between Russia and Ukraine
We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content in Ukrainian at scale in order to artificially amplify pro-Ukrainian narratives and generate off-platform traffic, thereby attempting to manipulate discourse about the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The network was observed to be using ‘clickbait’ tactics, using grabbing sticker text without showing the full details of the video in order to create engagement and attention.

February 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between February 1 – 29, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 12,127 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

757

59,404

Accounts targeting political discourse in Serbia
We assess that this network operated from Serbia and targeted a Serbian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Serbian language favorable to Serbia Against Violence coalition (SPN – Srbija Protiv Nasilja) and critical of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS – Srpska Napredna Stranka), attempting to manipulate Serbian elections discourse. In addition to its politically focused accounts, the network created fan/hate pages for Serbian top creators in order to generate further user engagement.

Internal

266

5,302

Accounts targeting political discourse in Guatemala
We assess that this network operated from Guatemala and targeted a Guatemalan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language critical of the Seed Movement Party (Movimiento Semilla) and in support of a rival politician, attempting to manipulate Guatemalan elections discourse. The network was found to utilize numerous fictitious personas with stock or stolen imagery as Profile Pictures.

Internal

261

448,152

Accounts targeting political discourse in Iraq
We assess that this network operated from Iraq and targeted an Iraqi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Arabic language favorable to Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF militia and critical of America and Israel, attempting to manipulate discourse on Iraq’s domestic politics. The network was found to create ‘news’ accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source.

Internal

132

4,128

Accounts targeting political discourse in Guatemala
We assess that this network operated from Guatemala and targeted a Guatemalan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish language favorable to the National Unity of Hope party and critical of politicians in rival parties, attempting to manipulate Guatemalan elections discourse. The network was found to utilize numerous fictitious personas with stock or stolen imagery as avatars.

Internal

65

116,612

Accounts amplifying pro-Iranian narratives
We assess this network operated from Iran and targeted audiences in the US and UK. Prior to October 2023, the individuals behind this network created inauthentic identities and used inauthentic means to gain user engagement on narratives surrounding UK domestic policy discourse. After October 2023, the network operator used the same inauthentic accounts to target the war between Hamas and Israel and artificially amplify pro-Iranian narratives and narratives critical of the US and Israel. The accounts in the network initially posted content associated with travel and tourism in order to build an audience, before switching to political topics.

Internal

46

12,837

Accounts targeting political discourse in Germany
We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network created opaque entities in order to artificially amplify narratives in German language favorable to the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) political party, promoting Christianity and criticizing Islam, attempting to manipulate Germany’s domestic politics. We assess that accounts within this network were posing as former Muslims in order to insert divisive rhetoric about Islam into spaces on TikTok where Islam-related hashtags were being searched.

Internal

16

110,161

Accounts promoting Chinese policy and culture
We assess this network operated from China and targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify positive narratives of China, including support for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) policy decisions and strategic objectives, as well as general promotion of Chinese culture. This network utilized accounts impersonating high-profile US creators and celebrities in an attempt to build an audience.

January 2024

This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted January 1 – 31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,358 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.

Detection source

Accounts in network

Followers of network

Description

Internal

21

61,026

Accounts targeting political discourse in Bangladesh

We assess that this network operated from Bangladesh and targeted a Bangladeshi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Bengali language favorable to another political party, attempting to manipulate Bangladesh elections discourse. Accounts within the network were found to create fictitious personas by cycling through different avatars showing different people on the same accounts.