Authenticity is the foundation of our community at TikTok, and we strive to foster an environment where genuine interactions and content thrive. As part of that effort, we continuously work to detect and disrupt covert influence operations that attempt to establish themselves on TikTok and undermine the integrity of our platform. You can learn more about how we do this work here.
In this report, we disclose information about the covert influence operations we disrupt to promote transparency and share learnings with our industry. For information about covert influence networks disrupted before January 2024, please see our quarterly Community Guidelines Enforcement reports. Starting in May 2024, we will be updating this page with new networks on a regular basis.
Terminology
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between December 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,313 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection Source | Accounts in network | Followers of Network | Description |
Internal | 27,217 | 70,892 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania We assess that this network was operated via a fake engagement vendor and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network used inauthentic accounts in order to promote the AUR political party and independent candidate Călin Georgescu, in an attempt to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. This campaign relied on posting comments rather than videos. |
Internal | 323 | 41,584 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to certain political candidates and critical of other political candidates, attempting to manipulate Indonesian local elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to repeatedly post duplicative content while slightly altering the video caption. |
Internal | 117 | 63,765 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to a political candidate, attempting to manipulate Indonesian presidential elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas who did not appear in the videos posted. |
Internal | 68 | 2 | Accounts targeting the Romanian diaspora in Moldova We assess that this network operated from Moldova and targeted the Romanian diaspora in Moldova. The individuals behind this network created fictitious personas to promote lurie Ciocan and the Social Democratic Party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. Accounts within the network were found to post an AI-generated video of Stephen the Great (Prince of Moldavia between 1457 and 1504) to promote the network's narrative. |
Internal | 51 | 1,177,876 | Accounts targeting the war between Russia and Ukraine We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives highlighting challenges faced by Ukrainian soldiers, questioning the credibility of the Ukrainian government, and suggesting declining support from NATO and Western allies. The network used technical means to obfuscate its true location. |
Internal | 21 | 123 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote Nicolae Ciucă and the PNL party, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The network was found to create fictitious personas. |
Internal | 9 | 38,404 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Iraq We assess that this network operated from Iraq and targeted an Iraqi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote communism in Iraq. The network was found to create a variety of fictitious personas including activists and academics. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between November 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 5,046 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection Source | Accounts in network | Followers of Network | Description |
Internal | 78 | 1,781 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Călin Georgescu, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to amplify the same comments repeatedly. |
Internal | 64 | 28,990 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Bangladesh We assess that this network operated from Bangladesh and targeted a Bangladeshi audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in the Bengali language favorable to a specific political party and critical of another political party. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source. |
Internal | 12 | 1,704 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives in the Romanian language favorable to political candidate Mircea Geoană, attempting to manipulate Romanian elections discourse. The accounts within the network were found to repost the same videos repeatedly. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between October 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 26,964 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection Source | Accounts in network | Followers of Network | Description |
Internal | 132 | 88,667 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Armenia We assess that this network operated from Armenia and targeted an Armenian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current administration. The network was found to commonly use images of Garegin Nzhdeh as account avatars. |
Internal | 109 | 1,086,821 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in favor of certain political candidates and critical of others, within the context of Indonesia's elections. The network commonly used images of Indonesian politicians as account profile pictures. |
Internal | 107 | 5,026 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Moldova We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the current Moldovan Government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to be using location obfuscation services in order to hide their true location. |
Internal | 45 | 8,389 | Accounts targeting the war between Russia and Ukraine We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content to artificially amplify pro-Russia narratives, within the context of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts. |
Internal | 26 | 66,507 | Accounts targeting the war between Israel and Hamas We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted a global audience, setting up accounts to target Arabic speakers. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts to artificially amplify narratives sympathetic to Iraqi and Iranian foreign policy on the Israel-Hamas war. The network was found to repurpose content by reposting duplicate content throughout its accounts. |
Internal | 21 | 17,863 | Accounts targeting perceptions of the Chinese Government in Japan We assess that this network operated from Japan and targeted a Japanese audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts and posted content in Japanese and Chinese in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of the Chinese Government. The network was observed to redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links. |
Internal | 22 | 157,913 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Moldova We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a Moldovan audience. The individuals behind this network created multiple accounts to artificially amplify pro-Russian narratives critical of the current Moldovan government, in an attempt to manipulate elections discourse. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source. |
Internal | 12 | 120,963 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Portuguese language critical of the current administration. We assess that the network posted content on non-political topics in order to gain engagement before pivoting to political content. |
Internal | 12 | 3,442 | Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States We assess that this network targeted a US audience. The individuals behind this network created a series of inauthentic accounts mimicking US nationals in order to amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza and US support of Israel. The network was found to display advanced operational security. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between September 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 9743 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection Source | Accounts in network | Followers of Network | Description |
Internal | 99 | 9,905,964 | Russian state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (Rossiya Segodnya) We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization Rossiya Segodnya (Including Sputnik news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations. |
Internal | 65 | 9,830,799 | Russian state-affiliated media accounts engaging in covert influence (TV-Novosti) We removed a network of accounts which we assess to be affiliated with Russian State-Affiliated Media organization TV-Novosti (Including RT news accounts) for violation of our policy against covert influence operations. |
External | 42 | 127,451 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Germany We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted a German audience. The individuals behind this network were found to coordinate outside of TikTok, through a messaging platform, where they shared tactics to amplify the reach of pro-AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) political content targeted towards the 2024 German state elections. The network attempted to circumvent action taken by TikTok against accounts or content that violated our policies. |
External | 22 | 299,692 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Romania We assess that this network operated from Romania and targeted a Romanian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to spread misinformation and promote narratives critical of the current Romanian government. The network was found to direct users away from TikTok to news websites which we assess to be managed by the network for the furtherance of its strategic goal. |
Internal | 15 | 134,537 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Brazil We assess that this network operated from Brazil and targeted a Brazilian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to a specific politician and critical of the current administration. The network was found to create inauthentic news accounts in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source. |
Internal | 14 | 140,955 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify political viewpoints through targeted content praising certain Indonesian politicians and criticising other Indonesian politicians. Accounts within the network were found to post very similar content to each other in quick succession, making minor edits each time in an attempt to amplify content reach. |
Internal | 11 | 27,873 | Accounts promoting the Iranian military We assess that this network operated from Iran and targeted a global audience, setting up accounts to target English, Arabic, Spanish and Farsi speakers. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify content projecting Iranian military strength and content displaying pro-Palestinian protests. The network was found to create misleading accounts which used insignia of an international organisation. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between August 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 7792 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection Source | Accounts in network | Followers of Network | Description |
External | 19,727 | 41,921 | Accounts targeting discourse on the Ukrainian war effort We assess that this network operated from Russia and targeted a Ukrainian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to undermine the Ukrainian Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center. The network was found to display anomalous user behavior which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content and redirect users away from TikTok through sharing of external links. |
Internal | 489 | 394,321 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Spanish, favorable to certain Mexican politicians. The network was found to pose as well-known news media entities in order to post content furthering its strategic aim. |
Internal | 76 | 214,715 | Accounts targeting discourse in Ukraine and the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine We assess that this network operated from Ukraine and targeted both Ukrainian and Russian audiences. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives in Ukrainian and Russian, critical of the Russian government. The network was found to create inauthentic news outlets in an attempt to appear as a more reputable information source. |
Internal | 37 | 52,968 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Mexico We assess that this network operated from Mexico and targeted a Mexican audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives critical of a specific Mexican politician. The network was found to post content in a news-like format critical of the politician. We assess that the network also created websites aligned with the accounts. |
External | 8 | 3,790,110 | Accounts targeting discourse about Russia We assess that this network operated from Italy and targeted a global audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to promote the Russian administration. The network was found to display anomalous user behavior which we assess to be an attempt to inauthentically amplify its content. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between July 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 6,019 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 238 | 530,476 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia We assess that this network operated from Indonesia and targeted an Indonesian audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify political viewpoints through targeted content praising certain Indonesian politicians and criticising other Indonesian politicians. Some of the network's accounts presented as dedicated 'fan accounts' for a specific politician. |
External | 94 | 44,896 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Israel We assess that this network operated from Egypt and targeted an Israeli audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives critical of Israel's actions in Gaza. We assess that the network coordinated online, outside of TikTok, and used artificial intelligence to aid in generation of fictitious Israeli personas, targeting different audiences by alternating between Arabic and Hebrew languages. |
Internal | 51 | 31,090 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Azerbaijan We assess that this network operated from Azerbaijan and targeted an Azerbaijani audience. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to artificially amplify narratives favorable to the current Azerbaijani administration. Members of the network were commonly found to use images of the Azerbaijani coat of arms as account profile pictures. |
Internal | 29 | 137,671 | Accounts promoting Russian foreign policy viewpoints in Europe We assess that this network operated from Germany and targeted primarily a German audience along with other European markets. The individuals behind this network created inauthentic accounts in order to amplify narratives favorable to Russian foreign policy. The network was found to alternate between multiple languages, indicating an attempt to target audiences from multiple markets. |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between June 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,824 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
External | 35 | 109,537 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Sweden |
Internal | 28 | 4,023 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between May 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 3,183 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 350 | 321,237 | Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States |
Internal | 250 | 58,641 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador, Colombia and Panama |
Internal | 107 | 199,978 | Accounts targeting political and social discourse in Mexico |
Internal | 67 | 322,297 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Gulf Countries, in particular Saudi Arabia |
Internal | 36 | 206,463 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Pakistan |
External | 32 | 39,877 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Ukraine |
Internal | 9 | 19,261 | Accounts targeting political discourse in the United States |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between April 1-30, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 3,263 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 580 | 148,627 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia |
Internal | 521 | 38,428 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela |
Internal | 116 | 5,568 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia |
Internal | 83 | 227,154 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Venezuela |
Internal | 26 | 1,186 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Ecuador |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between March 1-31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 168 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
etection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 59 | 31,503 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Indonesia |
Internal | 52 | 2,624,189 | Accounts targeting war between Russia and Ukraine |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted between February 1 – 29, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 12,127 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 757 | 59,404 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Serbia |
Internal | 266 | 5,302 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Guatemala |
Internal | 261 | 448,152 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Iraq |
Internal | 132 | 4,128 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Guatemala |
Internal | 65 | 116,612 | Accounts amplifying pro-Iranian narratives |
Internal | 46 | 12,837 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Germany |
Internal | 16 | 110,161 | Accounts promoting Chinese policy and culture |
This report contains information about the covert influence operations disrupted January 1 – 31, 2024. In addition to these new network disruptions, we removed 2,358 accounts associated with previously disrupted networks attempting to re-establish their presence within this reporting period.
Detection source | Accounts in network | Followers of network | Description |
Internal | 21 | 61,026 | Accounts targeting political discourse in Bangladesh |